In 1957, for example, Marcel's 'Schelling fut-il un précurseur de la philosophie de l'existence?' set out to review this obsessive return to Schelling repeated over the past fifty years. He writes, If, for a form of thought that aims at rigour before anything else, Schelling cannot be either a master or an example; for thought that, on the contrary, regards philosophy as a heroic adventure entailing risks and skirting abysses, he will always remain an exhilarating companion, and, perhaps even, an inspiration.
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16 Paul Tillich, 'Schelling und die Anfänge des Existentialistischen Protestes' in Hauptwerke, 1:392. 17 This is of course to accept Tillich's later mythologising of his encounter with Schelling at face-value; for a concerted attempt to demythologise it, see the works of Christian Danz, especially Religion als Freiheitsbewußtsein (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2000) . 18 Karl Jaspers, Schelling: Größe und Verhängnis (Munich: Piper, 1955 ), 332; translated in Judith Norman and Alistair Welchman, 'Editors' Introduction' to The New Schelling (London: Continuum, 2004) , 2 19 Gabriel Marcel, 'Schelling fut-il un précurseur de la philosophie de l'existence?' in Revue de Metaphysique et de Morale (1957), 87. We must remember that Marcel and other neo-Schellingians wrote in a scholarly vacuum.
When Tillich wrote his first doctoral thesis on Schelling in 1910, there was no book-length study of Schelling's later philosophy on which he could draw. Schelling had not yet been domesticated by the university; instead, as the above quotation clearly implies, the wild Schelling of the early twentieth century stood alongside Dostoevsky, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche as a fresh voice for the unorthodox. More specifically, for Marcel, Schelling 'prepared the terrain for… a renaissance of metaphysics on non-traditional foundations', a renaissance sorely needed to satisfy a thinking 'increasingly wary of the encroachment of legalistic categories on the one hand, and of the Hegelian temptation on the other.' 20 When it comes to identifying the elements of Schellingian philosophy that Marcel, Tillich and others found so appealing, a list of two items is usually given: system and freedom (to put it in the language of Heidegger's 1936 course on the Freiheitsschrift). As Marcel makes clear in the above, neo-Schellingianism is premised on the rejection of a choice between neo-Kantian legalism and Hegelian metaphysics, between philosophy limited to the subject and speculation that ignores it. The neo-Schellingians were precisely those who wanted both. 21 For Heidegger too, 'Schelling is the truly creative and boldest thinker of this whole age of German philosophy' 22 , precisely because he thinks through the compatibility of system (as 'the task of philosophy' 23 ) and freedom (with its own peculiar 'factuality' 24 ). In general, the neo-Schellingians are followers of Schelling to the extent they eschew the exclusive choice between human freedom and metaphysics. They chose both. That is, no theology should deny man's separation from God and radical freedom to sin; yet, on the other hand, no theology should use this as an excuse to sacrifice God's relation with the world and the systematic speculation this makes possible. Both aspects (system and freedom) must be retained, and the struggle to achieve this is the struggle to return to an attitude in which the sharp gulf between the "subjective" and "objective" realms
had not yet been created'. 31 And, Tillich now emphasises, this is done in the name of revealing an underlying asubjective-anobjective transcendental condition of experience.
Schelling 'turned toward "subjectivity", not as something opposed to "objectivity", but as that living experience in which both objectivity and subjectivity are rooted… [He] tried to discover the creative realm of being which is prior to and beyond the distinction between objectivity and subjectivity.' 32 Such a realm of being is 'the Source whence springs my thinking and acting'. 33 To locate and describe this source is the very pinnacle of criticism, for this is the transcendental condition that makes all of life possible.
The correlation between man and world (freedom and system) is here recast as a means of accessing a further principle -piety, the primordial realm of ultimate concern which 29 orients both being as a whole and the human subject in particular. The transcendental source of subjective existence and objective being is the ground/abyss of all life and is obtained through a neo-Schellingian methodology. That is, Tillich (repeating German Idealism) identifies the Kantian attempt to pinpoint the psychological conditions of representation with the metaphysical search for grounds of being; he realises, that is, that 'the transcendental stratum of knowledge corresponds to the transcendental stratum of being' 34 , and such a speculo-critical transcendental stratum is named 'ultimate concern'. This then is one of the core functions of Tillichean correlation in general: the determination of ultimacy through a dual discourse of man and world.
The discussion of revelation in the first volume of the Systematic Theology further clarifies this knot of criticism, correlation and ultimacy. Revelation is defined precisely as 'the manifestation of what concerns us ultimately' 35 , the refocusing of attention onto pieties.
Such a process of refocusing consists in two moments (that ultimately collapse into identity):
a 'negative side' of critique 36 and a positive moment of speculation where there 'opens a new dimension of knowledge, the dimension of understanding in relation to our ultimate concern and to the mystery of being.' 37 It is of course the initial critical moment that concerns me here, a moment that is rigorously correlated by Tillich into accounts of the (objective) 'abysmal element in the ground of being' 38 and a (subjective) ecstatic shock to the mind. In a paragraph that recalls the later Schelling as much as it foreshadows Goodchild's Deleuzian invocation of limit-experiences, Tillich writes:
The threat of non-being, grasping the mind, produces the 'ontological shock' in which the negative side of the mystery of being -its abysmal element -is experienced. where such a critique is not extrinsic to the theological enterprise but the ground from whence it perpetually begins again. 47 There emerges here, therefore, a mutant form of criticism which is also, I will argue in the next section, the most paradigmatic form of criticism ('criticism as such') to the extent that it identifies and describes the transcendental condition of subjective experience and objective being that Kant misses: ultimate concernor piety. 
Criticism as Such
Theology becomes critical in Tillich's neo-Schellingianism. In order to enrich this description of such criticism (and the conditions of its own possibility), I now turn to Philip Goodchild's Whereas the Kantian corpus responds to the crisis of metaphysics and Tillich to the crisis of idolatry, Goodchild's early work similarly responds to the crisis of piety -a crisis which is simultaneously ecological, economic and mental. 53 The material nature of these crises should not be overlooked; the critical thinker is not merely provoked by ideas, but by the lack (or abundance) of matter:
The last insight to arrive [in writing this book] was the contemporary truth of suffering: a growing awareness that current trends in globalisation, trade and the spread of technology are not only leading towards a condition where the human habitat is unsustainable, but the urgency and responsibility announced by the preventable catastrophe mean that little else is worth thinking about.
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The Goodchildian project cannot therefore consist merely in the identification and description of the conditions of these crises; it needs also to ameliorate, transform and intensify these conditions in the name of a better future, fusing criticism with activism. To put it bluntly, Goodchild's Capitalism and Religion is nothing other than a threefold investigation into the possibility of a future for thought: a diagnosis of the present conditions of crisis-ridden thinking, a description of the future conditions necessary for renewing thought and crucially also an attempt to meet these conditions. This forms 'a critical theory of piety'. 72 The potency of the past, on this reading, is a transcendental condition of existence that makes life possible, but must equally necessarily be suppressed and pushed into the past for that life to be possible. A Žižekian Goodchild would claim: both the positing and negation of piety are necessary for the possibility of thought. As the future of thinking would depend on the suppression of all pieties, criticism in any form would become impossible.
The above already indicates why Goodchild cannot subscribe to this Žižekian reading comes at a price: 'The price is the irretrievable loss of the subject's self-identity: the verbal sign that stands for the subject -in which the subject posits himself as self-identical -bears the mark of an irreducible dissonance; it never "fits" the subject.' (Ibid, 47) The suppression of the past is 'the elusive intangible gap that sustains "reality".' (Ibid, 68) invisible' because modernity 'arises from a disavowal of the determinate practices of directing attention.' (Ibid, it is perhaps for this reason that Schelling devotes a treatise to it. Schelling's analysis of the Samothracian mystery-cult is a means of locating the pieties which had surfaced during the crisis. Thought only has a future if such pieties can be described, and such description is dependent upon thinking (as) catastrophe (as Schelling does here). To philosophically analyse divine names is to simultaneously reveal the workings of criticism itself: The Deities of Samothrace is ultimately a meta-philosophical enterprise.
The Right to Name, or Back to Kant
The above may seem to have strayed far from Tillich; however, an analysis of two quotations can rapidly show otherwise. First:
One is enabled to speak of that which is most vital in the present, of that which makes the present a generative force, only insofar as one immerses oneself in the creative process which brings the future forth out of the past. Tillich's Schelling is very much the Goodchildian Schelling of the third potency, just as Tillich's critical project as a whole is one attentive to the future of thinking.
The second quotation is taken from Tillich's typology of reason in the opening to
Perspectives. Here he more than half-heartedly affirms the revolutionary power of 'critical reason':
It was not a calculating reason which decides whether to do this or that, depending on which is more advantageous. Rather, it was a full, passionate, revolutionary emphasis on man's essential goodness in the name of the principle of justice.
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Tillich goes on to label it 'revolutionary reason' 91 , and in so doing he links critique inextricably to the power to change the future, to reorient one's ultimate concerns and to manage one's pieties differently. In his invocations of justice and revolution, he also makes explicit a theme that has been bubbling under the surface of this essay from the very beginning: criticism and politics. And it is with this link that I want to conclude.
At stake here is the right or legitimacy by which the κριτικός accesses what is ultimate, names it and transforms it: from where does the κριτικός obtain this authority? It is, I am arguing, a matter of positioning. The κριτικός has the right to name what grounds and ungrounds experience because she stands in the position from which the ground is most accessible. It is a matter therefore of the proximity from which one confronts the crisis -that is, of politics.
Criticism as such, I have argued, concerns itself with crises. It situates itself in limitexperiences where piety (or the future) manifests itself. What orients thinking and acting only becomes clear in a crisis -and, as this principle of orientation is a key transcendental condition, criticism is not criticism as such unless it thinks (in a) crisis. The κριτικός must seek out the crises in the turba gentium, because it is there that the future is manufactured.
There is a danger here and it is a danger of which Kant in particular was acutely aware -the The critical thinker is an enthusiastic partisan. While she is not a fanatic militant situated in the fray (so liable to the errors of immediacy and impatience), neither is she apathetic and unconcerned. She possesses discursive distance, yet still attends to the crisis. What is more, and here Kant is insistent, something more is revealed to this enthusiastic philosopher than would have otherwise been: enthusiasm reveals the human faculty for improvement.
Amelioration is possible for the enthusiastic κριτικός, the thinker of the revolution or the catastrophe. At this point, Kant approaches Tillich, Schelling and Goodchild most closely.
As a coda to this invocation of the politics of criticism or an extension of its cultural purview, one final work cited by Toscano must be brought in to enrich the problematic:
Euclides da Cuhna's Rebellion in the Backlands. 100 What is remarkable about da Cuhna's book is that it takes as its subject matter all the crises covered in this essay (and more) in the name of understanding the formation and orientation of a future political community. It is the synthesis of all attempts at criticism as such. Rebellion begins with an extensive geological survey of the relevant region of Brazil in the manner of Schelling's Deities of Samothrace. As
Toscano goes on to point out, 'Geological violence seems to presage and prepare the apocalyptic politics.' 101 Geological crises are also crises of politics and religion: in all three, the same pieties, the same concerns, the same future, are revealed. Moreover, da Cuhna explicitly invokes these links between politics, religion and geology in the name of prophecy -that is, in the name of the future. Rebellion sets itself the task of using these crises, 
